This paper describes the available data and research on venture capital investments and performance. We comment on the challenges inherent in those data and research as well as possible opportunities to do better.
I.

Introduction
Venture capital is a relatively small financial institution. In the five years from 2009 to 2013, the NVCA -National Venture Capital Association (2014) -reports that an average of fewer than 1,200 firms received venture capital for the first time annually in the U.S. This is a very small fraction -roughly one in 500 or 0.2% -of the 600,000 firms (with employees) that are started each year (U.S. SBA (2012)). Over the same five-year period, U.S. venture capital partnerships received an average of less than $18 billion in new capital commitments from investors each year. And these figures are for the U.S., by far the largest market for venture capital in the world.
So why then does venture capital receive a large amount of theoretical, empirical, policy and media interest? From a theoretical perspective, venture capital is particularly interesting because it encompasses the extremes of many corporate finance challenges: uncertainty, information asymmetry and asset intangibility. At the same time, from an empirical and policy perspective, venture capital has had a disproportionate impact. Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that venture capital is three to four times more powerful than corporate R&D as a spur to innovation. Kaplan and Lerner (2009) find that roughly 50% of the "entrepreneurial" IPOs in recent years are venture-backed despite the fact that only 0.2% of all firms receive venture funding.
But despite the extent of interest in venture capital, substantial misunderstandings about this intermediary persist. This is particularly true in policy circles, which have seen the launch of ill-considered efforts to promote venture activity in many geographies (see Lerner (2009)) , and media discussions. This reflects the facts that venture capital is a form of private equity, and that aspect of private equity is that it is indeed private. Unlike mutual funds, venture capitalists are typically exempt from the Investment Company Act of Act of 1940, and typically do not disclose much information to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission or other regulators.
This has led to a shortage of reliable industry data and to an unappealing setting where industry advocates make sweeping claims about the benefits and critics make broad charges on very shaky empirical foundations.
This lack of a comprehensive dataset has also posed challenges to academic research.
One of the most important ways that academic research in the social sciences proceeds is by researchers replicating and exploring the limitations of earlier studies. Instead, in venture capital, because the studies often rely on proprietary datasets that are not shared more generally, studies are difficult to replicate or refute. Another unappealing consequence is that dubious or misleading studies can linger for many years without rebuttal.
Sadly, this problem may be getting worse, rather than better. The past decade has seen of the rise of "individualized entrepreneurial finance": angels, groups of angels, crowdfunding platforms, and the like. While venture capital remains concentrated in a few metropolitan areas, mostly in the United States, the amount of angel investments appear to be increasing in many nations (Wilson and Silva, 2013) . Active involvement in the investment and close social ties between angels and entrepreneurs may help to overcome the lack of minority shareholder and legal protections that are important for the development of more institutionalized capital markets.
These investors are typically very reluctant to share information about their activities, both for strategic reasons as well as due to a reluctance of personal exposure.
In this paper, we describe the available data and research on venture capital investments and performance. As we do so, we comment on the challenges inherent in those data and research as well as possible opportunities to do better. We begin by describing the data and research on investments by venture capital funds in portfolio companies. We follow that by describing the data and research on investments (by institutional investors and wealthy individuals) in the venture capital funds.
II. Investment Data and Research
A. Longstanding databases
Much of the early research into venture capital relied on information available in IPO prospectuses and S-1 registration statements. For the subset of venture-backed firms that eventually go public, voluminous information is available. Investments in firms that do not go public are more difficult to uncover, since these investments are usually not publicized.
Unfortunately, because only a relatively modest fraction of venture-backed companies go public, researchers must dig deeper. where they obtain data from a limited partner investor in the two funds. VX does a much better job of including firms in the database that the funds actually invested in. The funds that VS excludes tend to be predominantly funds that failed, leading to a likely upward performance bias in VS. there has been substantial subsequent deterioration in the quality of both databases. In particular, the initial focus by VS on valuations seems to have been largely abandoned. In part, this may reflect the challenges associated with the reliance on commercial data providers, who may decide on an investment in ensuring data quality that while profit-maximizing, is less than an academic financial economist would prefer.
B. More recent alternatives
There are a number of recent alternatives to VX and VS. Several databases that focus on tracking private equity (buyout) funds and transactions also include some VC funds and deals.
These databases are typically based on disclosures from limited partners, filings with the SEC, and other public (but often difficult to access) sources. Examples include Capital IQ, Pitchbook and Preqin. VCExperts is a newer database that specializes in VC deals and is sourced from state and federal regulatory filings by private companies.
The SEC maintains Form D filings of private financings, but these provide only the amount of funding and not the names of investors.
There are some websites that track venture capital financings. Tech Crunch's, Crunchbase, is the best known. While many of these newer databases are promising, they have not gotten the kind of scrutiny that VS and VX have. Thus, their ability to support academic research is still to be fully determined.
C.
The bottom line on portfolio company data As mentioned above, the basic story on portfolio company data is not a great one. There are large inconsistencies in the two major existing databases, VX and VS, and a general problem of incompleteness. Furthermore, qualitatively, both show deterioration in data quality over the past decade. As we will discuss in the conclusion, there is an opportunity for a new providerwhether for-profit or non-profit -to significantly improve on these data.
It also seems possible that the fund performance data providers described in the next section, particularly Burgiss, Cambridge Associates and Preqin will be able to augment their fund data with data on individual portfolio companies.
III.
Performance data
There are currently three major providers of data on VC (and private equity) performance -Burgiss Private I, Cambridge Associates (CA) and Preqin. Pitchbook is a fourth newer entrant with more of a focus on private equity performance. Until recently, there was a fifth, Thomson
Venture Economics (TVE). For reasons likely related to poor quality data that we describe below, TVE decided to discontinue its database and, instead, make CA available on TVE's platform.
As with the data on VC firm investments in portfolio companies, VC fund performance data are also potentially subject to biases:
• First, the data from any one provider may be incomplete. For instance, a number of leading venture capital funds have pressured pension funds not to post on-line or to report their performance to data providers such as Preqin. Some have gone as far as to drop institutions that cannot make such commitments as limited partners (Lerner, et al. (2011) ). Given the highly skewed nature of performance in venture capital, even a handful of omissions can have a substantial impact on reported performance figures.
• Second, it is possible there is a backfill bias in that the databases report positive past returns for funds that are newly added to the database. Many first-time funds do not have any institutional investors, and may not be captured by commercial data providers unless they successfully raise a second fund.
• Third, to the extent that the databases rely on data directly reported by the GPs, it is possible that poorly performing funds stop reporting or never report at all.
• Fourth, to the extent that database providers rely on information from GPs-or the LPs report data from GPs without adjustment-the quality of the information can suffer from distributions at the price prior to the distribution, the sales that ensue after the distribution often mean that the realized price is substantially lower. Again, because many LPs do not adjust the GPs' data, these inflated valuations may find their way into databases.
• Finally, the commercial platforms use different data definitions that complicate crossplatform comparisons. For example, funds are generally grouped by vintage year -the year they began. However the different platforms define beginning differently. Burgiss groups funds by the year in which the year the fund first takes down money from investors. CA groups funds by the year the fund is legally formed. Preqin groups funds by the year the fund makes its first investment in a company. While these three definitions will often coincide, they do not always do so.
In addition, some funds not only make investments in venture capital / early stage companies, but also in growth stage companies and in buyouts. Indeed, it is frequently difficult to define where early-stage investing ends and later-stage transactions begin. While traditional buyout groups such as TPG have increasingly taken part in the later rounds of social media companies, many venture funds have undertaken growth investments in traditional manufacturing firms in markets such as India and China. In some cases, one commercial platform will classify a multi-asset class investor as a VC fund while a different platform will classify the same investor as a buyout fund.
In the rest of this section, we describe the coverage of the major platforms and their advantages and disadvantages.
A. Coverage Total committed capital is taken from the annual totals provided by the Private Equity Analyst.
Burgiss and Preqin have a higher proportion of total commitments from 2000 to 2008.
Capital commitments for CA funds were not available for the study.
As with the number of funds, TVE had strong coverage in the 1980s and 1990s with over 100% of committed capital in the 1980s and almost 80% in the 1990s. In the 2000s, TVE dropped off. Preqin had performance data on funds with roughly 70% of committed capital;
Burgiss performance data on funds with 60% of committed capital.
In Over time, the number of funds in the Burgiss database has increased as Burgiss has gained permission to access the investment performance of an increasing number of LPs. The one potential bias in the Burgiss data is that the LPs who allow access are selected. In particular, it is possible that the LPs who allow access, as a group, have tended to invest in above average funds and, therefore, exclude some below average funds. For this bias to be in the data, however: (1) there would have to be a group of institutional investors who invested in the worst VC funds, had poor performance, and do not use Burgiss to measure their fund performance; (2) no other institutional investors who do use Burgiss invested in those same VC funds, so the poorly performing PE funds do not show up in the data set. Given the size of the Burgiss data set, this seems unlikely. Furthermore, the fact that Burgiss covers almost 90% of the total capital committed to venture capital in post-2005 vintages suggests that this bias, even if it were to exist, is likely to be small for those vintages.
Preqin
Preqin's performance data are sourced primarily from public filings by pension funds, from FOIA requests to public pension funds, and voluntarily from GPs (about 60% of performance data) and LPs. Third, Preqin reports performance for a number of funds for which it does not have the granular cash flow data. In other words, some LPs simply report IRRs and multiples without reporting the cash flows that generated them.
Cambridge Associates (CA)
CA sources its data from voluntary disclosures by LPs and by GPs who have raised or are trying to raise capital. Because GPs typically do not try to raise a new fund if their performance is poor, CA may have a bias towards successful GPs. Also favoring this bias is CA's traditional orientation to providing services to endowments, who appear to have (historically at least) selected the most successfully venture capital LPs with which to invest (Lerner, et al. (2007) ).
Whatever its other strengths and weaknesses, CA also is the least transparent of the commercial platforms.
Thomson Venture Economics (TVE)
TVE has traditionally sourced its data from both LPs and GPs in a manner similar to that used by CA. The major issue with TVE was that it appeared to stop updating performance on roughly 40% of the venture capital and private equity funds in the VE sample. Stucke (2011) 
D. The bottom line on performance providers
Based on the research done to date, Burgiss is likely the best of the commercial data providers. The data it has are current and do not appear to be selected. Given the similar results in Preqin and CA, it is unlikely there is any appreciable bias across these databases. The fact that Burgiss now covers performance for almost 90% of the total capital committed to venture capital in post-2005 vintages suggests that the ability to do research on venture capital funds will continue to improve over time. This is particularly encouraging given that Burgiss makes its data available to researchers through proposals to the PERC (Private Equity Research Consortium). Kaplan serves on PERC's academic advisory board.
While Preqin (and Pitchbook) have potential selection biases, they are also powerful and valuable because they identify the performance of individual funds. This allows a better fix on the potential selection biases at work.
Thomson Venture Economics (TVE) should not be used. Its database has been discontinued. Results in past work using TVE should be with viewed with caution.
It is also worth noting that this is a dynamic field, with a number of new entrants.
Examples include eFront and State Street Bank, which have gathered data as part of their work with general and limited partners, and analytics solutions providers such as Bison. While it is still early to evaluate many of these efforts, the promise of more and higher quality data augurs well for future research opportunities.
A "horse of a different color" is the Private Capital Research Institute, in which both of the authors are involved (Kaplan as an academic advisory board member and Lerner as director).
This foundation-supported non-profit is in the process of developing an database exclusively for academic research, modelled after the architecture for compiling confidential information employed by the U.S. government. By restricting the data use to these applications, it is hoped that a broader swath of the industry will consent to the utilization of their data.
The heart of the PCRI effort is high quality data about private capital investments. While commercial data vendors typically piece this together from a variety of sources, including security filings and disclosure statements by institutional investors, frequently the information is incomplete and inconsistent.
The vision of the PCRI is to focus very much on obtaining data from the private equity firms themselves. To date, over 40 of the 100 largest private equity firms world-wide have provided data to the PCRI, or are in the process of doing so. It might be plausibly wondered why private equity firms would be willing to share data with the PCRI when the commercial databases have often struggled to get data from these institutions. The answers are several:
1) The constraints the PCRI places on the use of the data. In particular, the PCRI is designed to be a project run by academics and for academics. The information is used exclusively for academic research, rather than for any commercial purpose.
2) The research protocol simultaneously allows academics to undertake high-quality research while protecting the confidentiality of the data being provided by the private equity firms. In particular, following the model employed by the United States
Bureau of the Census when making available information that it and the United States
Internal Revenue Service collect, academics can undertake detailed cross-tabulated analyses but not download or view individual data entries. Essentially the academics would be able to upload queries and download results without "touching" the individual data entries.
3) A third reason for the success of the PCRI in generating participation in the private equity community has to do with the fact that the industry itself is under much greater scrutiny. In particular, in the aftermath of the financial crisis there has been much greater attention to institutions such as hedge funds and private capital groups that traditionally were exempt from most regulatory oversight in the United States and Europe. As a result of these pressures, industry leaders have increasingly appreciated the need for high quality independent research.
Gathering information from the private equity firms has limitations. Even if every active group chose to participate, there would still be a number of groups that have gone out of business. As a result, the PCRI is complementing the data gathered from the private equity firms with data from commercial sources. In addition, the PCRI is working with a commercial group that has developed an extremely efficient and cost-effective manner to collect the cash flow data of private equity funds from public regulatory and disclosure filings. As regulations push private equity groups to undertake more and more security filings, this will likely be an increasingly fruitful methodology. This relationship will allow us to gain more experience with the harvesting of such data. Thus, the use of commercial data sources allow the PCRFI to get a more holistic picture of the activity in the private capital industry, as well as to quantify any potential biases that may affect rigorous scientific analysis.
In addition to our own efforts to acquire data for the PCRI, the support of the institutional investor community has proved valuable. Because there are ambiguities about whether institutional investors can share data on existing funds, the PCRI initially did not ask them for data directly. Nonetheless, a number of institutional investors -including some formally on our practitioner board-have been very helpful in encouraging the private capital firms in which they have invested to share data with the PCRI.
IV. Conclusions
Venture capital is an increasingly important intermediary, able to transform capital into new firms and innovations in an apparently highly productive manner. This intermediary is attracting increasing interest by policymakers and investors, but the availability of data as well as the consistency of the academic findings using these data are still lacking.
This paper attempted to take a careful look at the availability of information about this intermediary. Several conclusions emerge from our review of the major data sources for venture capital investments and funds:
• Reflecting the relative lack of disclosure and the substantial information asymmetries surrounding venture capital, it is difficult to paint in definitive terms the level of investment activity and fund performance.
• Existing databases differ in methodologies, and analyses frequently produce discrepancies and varying conclusions. These problems are particularly prevalent when it comes to transaction-level data.
• That being said, the venture data space has seen substantial entry, particularly in regard to performance measurement. As a result, the quality of information available has increased in recent years and can be expected to continue to do so going forward. 
